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Im Fokus
Taking Stock: The Focal Points of Abe’s Foreign
Policy
Ein Jahr japanische Außenpolitik unter Shinzo¯
Abe: Eine Bilanz
Frank A. Stengel
Abstract
In September 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo¯ Abe resigned after only one year in office. Abe,
who had been Chief Cabinet Secretary in the cabinet of Jun’ichiro¯ Koizumi, had gained popularity
mainly because of his tough stance towards North Korea, in particular concerning the abduction
issue. During Abe’s premiership, foreign policy remained his forte. This article examines the
continuities and discontinuities of Abe’s and Koizumi’s foreign policies. Overall, Abe has continued
with Koizumi’s agenda of “normalising” Japan’s foreign policy. In spite of his reputation as an
ultranationalist and revisionist, however, he has made serious efforts to repair Japan’s strained
relations with China and South Korea, which had deteriorated due to Koizumi’s regular visits to
the Yasukuni shrine. Furthermore, Abe has fostered strategic relations with India and Australia,
and worked to further deepen the alliance with the United States.1
Keywords: Japan, foreign policy, Abe, Koizumi
Introduction
On September 12th, 2007, after only one year in office, Shinzo¯ Abe surprisingly
resigned as Prime Minister, sending a “shock wave” (NNI, 18/9/07) throughout
Japan. After a series of political scandals had led to an astounding defeat of
his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the July 2007 upper house elections (cf.
Köllner 2007), Abe at first announced his intention to stay in power. However,
facing the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) fierce opposition to the extension
1 The author would like to thank Johannes Gerschewski, Ryoma Sakaeda and Tyler Vose for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. All remaining errors are the author’s
responsibility alone.
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of the controversial Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) as well as
the imminent publication of an article in the Japanese weekly Shu¯kan gendai
investigating the finances of Abe’s support organisation, threatening to uncover
another political scandal, he resigned not even two months later (J.A., 5/2007:
101-102; The Guardian 2007).
Abe had succeeded Jun’ichiro¯ Koizumi with high approval ratings, setting
out a bold agenda including the revision of the constitution and improvements
to Japan’s education and civil service systems. Before succeeding Koizumi as
Prime Minister, Abe had been Secretary-General of the LDP and Chief Cabinet
Secretary in the Koizumi cabinet. Foreign policy had always been his forte, and
he has gained popularitymainly because of his tough stance towards North Korea,
in particular with respect to the abduction issue. It is the aim of this article to
provide an overview of the central focal points of Japanese foreign policy during
the Abe premiership. To what extent does Abe’s approach present a continuation
of Koizumi’s foreign policy, and to what extent does it depart from it?
This analysis proceeds as follows: Firstly, I will examine Japan’s policies
towards its immediate neighbours, North Korea, China and South Korea. In the
subsequent part, Japan’s respective nascent strategic relationship with India and
Australia will be addressed as well as the alliance with the United States (US). I
will conclude by giving a summary of the central focal points of Abe’s foreign
policy and provide a cautious outlook about what to expect from Abe’s successor
Yasuo Fukuda.
Turning Around Japan’s “Neighbourhood Policy”
The Strained Relations with North Korea
In Japan’s dealings with North Korea, two topics loom large: North Korea’s
ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests and the abductions issue. These issues
will be addressed in more detail below. Since the early 1990s, the United States
had been concerned about North Korea’s nuclear programme, and Japan has
shared this concern to a varying degree. As the result of Pyongyang’s 1993 test
launch of a Nodong-1 missile over the Sea of Japan, which demonstrated the
vulnerability of significant parts of Japan to a ballistic missile attack, North Korea
was increasingly seen as a security concern in Tokyo. However, since the first
North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan proved – despite US requests – to be reluctant
to putmilitary pressure on Pyongyang and instead pursued a policy of engagement
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towards North Korea via the Korean Peninsula EnergyDevelopmentOrganisation
(KEDO), in line with South Korea’s “sunshine policy”.2 Supplementing these
multilateral efforts, Tokyo has approached Pyongyang in bilateral initiatives.
Then, in 1998, Pyongyang fired a Taepodong-1 missile over Japanese airspace,
rendering Japan’s exposure to ballistic missile attacks undeniable and significantly
heightening the Japanese public’s threat perception. This led to increased
difficulties for Tokyo to keep up its strategy of engagement towards North Korea,
particularly since incidents increased of suspicious ships entering Japanese waters.
Japanese threat perceptions were raised by the so-called second nuclear crisis in
2002/03, when Pyongyang admitted to a secret nuclear weapons programme and
withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Prime Minister Koizumi, who came to power in 2001, dealt with the North
Korean threat with a mixed strategy of engagement and containment. On the
one hand, Tokyo has taken steps to balance Pyongyang by embarking on a
far-reaching reformulation of its post-Cold War security policy (Bleiker 2003;
Hughes 2004).3 Koizumi took steps to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, most
notably through Japan’s active participation in the US “global war on terrorism”
(GWOT), in order to assure US support in countering the North Korean threat
(Hughes 2007). In addition to that, Japan has embarked on a wide-reaching
force reconstruction, developing power-projection capabilities for all its military
branches. Furthermore, North Korea has been an important factor in Tokyo’s
decision to acquire ballistic-missile defence (BMD) systems, prominent in Japan’s
revised 2004 National Defence Programme Guidelines. After Pyongyang’s
multiple test missile launches in July 2006, Tokyo has striven to speed up
cooperation with the US on BMD deployment (Hughes/Krauss 2007). Despite
his efforts to balance the North Korean threat, Koizumi worked with South
Korea to convince the US to enter into direct negotiations with Pyongyang, and
since 2003 Japan has participated in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear
programme (Hughes 2004). The Prime Minister combined these multilateral
2 The so-called “sunshine policy” refers to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s policy of
cooperative engagement towards Pyongyang (cf. e.g. Gerschewski 2007).
3 The North Korean threat, of course, is not the only reason for Japan’s changed security policy.
China’s economic rise and military build-up as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001
(9/11), have played a significant role as well. However, North Korea presents the most immediate
threat to Japanese national security and thus has to be seen as a crucial factor in bringing about
this development (cf. Hughes 2007).
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efforts with bilateral initiatives of engagement,most notably visiting North Korea
in 2002 and 2004 to reboot bilateral normalisation negotiations (Hughes/Krauss
2007). The main rationale behind the trips to Pyongyang was the attempt to find
a diplomatic solution to the so-called abduction issue, which refers to the still
unclear whereabouts of most of the (according to Tokyo) overall 17 Japanese
citizens that North Korean agents kidnapped in the 1970s and 1980s, forcing
them to work as language instructors for spies. North Korea maintains that
despite five abductees, who returned to Japan in 2002, all other missing persons
had died. Tokyo adheres to the assumption that further abductees remain in
North Korea and demands their return as well as the handover of the kidnappers
and a full clarification of the issue (J.A., 5/2007: 95-96; NNI, 7/9/07).
In contrast to Koizumi,who has not only balanced but also engaged Pyongyang,
Abe has pursued a decidedly tougher policy towards North Korea. Even prior
to assuming office, Abe has been well known for his uncompromising position,
in particular with respect to the abduction issue. He became popular in 2002
when he accompanied Koizumi on his trip to Pyongyang and urged him not
to sign the Japan-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Pyongyang
Declaration. When his opposition became known to the public, Abe emerged as
a “political star” (Edström 2007: 26). After Koizumi’s resignation, Abe placed
his bid for the premiership mainly on his tough stance on the abduction issue.
Of all people it was North Korea’s dictator Kim Jong Il who on July 5th, 2006,
played in Abe’s hands by test-firing another seven missiles. Abe, at that time
Chief Cabinet Secretary, led other conservative politicians in denouncing the
missile test and reasserted Japan’s right to preventive strikes. This tough reaction
supported Abe’s position compared to his more moderate main contender Yasuo
Fukuda who subsequently withdrew his (not yet official) candidacy (Edström
2007; Hughes 2004; IISS 2007). During Abe’s premiership, the abductions
have remained his pet issue, and he has been able to gather US support for the
Japanese position (J.A., 5/2007: 95-96; NNI, 2/11/07). However, his insistence
that the matter be discussed within the framework of the six-party talks on North
Korea’s nuclear programme has hampered his ability to influence the negotiations
(Mochizuki 2007a).
Abe’s attitude towards Pyongyang even hardened on October 10th, 2006,
when the information reached him of the first North Korean nuclear test. Abe
was on his way from Beijing to Seoul at the time, and the nuclear test dominated
bilateral talks with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. Abe made clear
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that the incident was not tolerable and announced that Japan would not only
push for the United Nations (UN) to adopt sanctions but would also impose
unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang – an announcement which Tokyo swiftly
implemented. Furthermore, Abe has used the incident to further push his reform
agenda for the defence sector, and the nuclear test led to a heightened debate
in the media about whether Japan should acquire its own nuclear deterrent
(ST, 22/8/07). Aware of the danger of setting off an arms race, however, Abe
moved quickly to confirm Japan’s non-nuclear stance (Hughes/Krauss 2007; Shim
2006).4
Repairing Neighbourly Relations: China and South Korea
When Koizumi resigned as Prime Minister, the relations to Japan’s neighbours,
most notably China and South Korea, were at a low. In part, this is due to
unresolved issues of Japan’s wartime and colonial history. Furthermore, Japan
is still entangled in territorial disputes with China as well as with South Korea,
and despite increasing economic interdependence between Japan and China, the
latter’s rise as an economic power and its military build-up combined with the
Taiwan issue are one of Japan’s two most important security concerns (Hughes
2004; Mochizuki 2007b). Aside from these factors, during Koizumi’s term,
Japan’s political relations to Beijing and Seoul further deteriorated due to the
Prime Minister’s regular visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine. The shrine,
commemorating Japan’s war dead, is highly disputed because it includes a number
of Class-A war criminals convicted by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal set up after
the Asia-Pacific war (cf. Richter 2007). Koizumi’s visits in his capacity as Prime
Minister were perceived in Beijing and Seoul as an attempt to “whitewash” past
aggressions (Jiang 2007: 16) and aroused a wave of international protests. Beijing
cut off all summit meetings, and in 2003 anti-Japanese incidents began to break
out in China, which in 2005 peaked in violent anti-Japanese demonstrations
in several Chinese cities. Although Koizumi apologized for Japan’s war history,
bilateral relations remained poisoned (Berger 2007; Katz/Ennis 2007). As in
the case of China, Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine triggered widespread
4 In fact the Japanese debate about nuclear weapons is very limited and seems, as then Deputy
Press Secretary Tomohiko Taniguchi pointed out in October 2006, more like “a debate about
whether or not Japan should really debate the matter” (Taniguchi 2006: 7). On Japan’s (lack of)
inclination to pursue nuclear weapons, cf. Izumi/Furukawa 2007.
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protests in South Korea. Furthermore, Seoul suspended military-to-military
dialogue, temporarily recalled its ambassador and banned the import of Japanese
cultural items. In turn, a Korean campaign to rename the Sea of Japan to the
East Sea and the issuing of a postal stamp commemorating the Tokdo/Takeshima
Islands, which are disputed between the two states, aroused Japanese protests.
This led to renewed debates about Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.
In April 2006, the quarrel even culminated in South Korea threatening the use
of force against survey ships from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency to be
dispatched in reaction to the South Korean announcement to rename the Sea of
Japan (Berger 2007; Edström 2007; Katz/Ennis 2007).
While Koizumi had alienated Beijing and Seoul, Abe proved to be much more
willing to compromise in his dealings with Japan’s neighbours. At first glance,
this seems surprising given that Abe is a conservative with rather hawkish and
revisionist views on foreign policy and history issues (Hughes/Krauss 2007). Abe
is an advocate of a more patriotic, stronger and “normal” Japan and had in
the past been a “staunch defender of Prime Minister Koizumi’s right to visit
the Yasukuni shrine” (Edström 2007: 71). Pursuing the goal to abolish the
“post-war regime”, Abe called for a revision of the Japanese constitution, the
strengthening of Japan’s military and the adding of more patriotic content to
history textbooks, less critical of Japan’s war-time aggression. During the contest
to succeed Koizumi, Abe was seen as the right candidate for those who perceived
China as a threat and deemed it necessary to stand up to what was perceived as
“Chinese bullying” (Edström 2007: 44; Jiang 2007). Nevertheless, as it became
likely for Abe to succeed Koizumi and domestic and international pressure on
the government to improve relations with Japan’s neighbours increased, Abe
softened his stance on the Yasukuni issue and refused to give a clear answer if
he would visit the shrine if elected (Jiang 2007). Moreover, on October 2nd,
2006, Abe announced that he would adhere to then Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama’s 1995 statement, in which he apologized for Japan’s colonial rule
and wartime atrocities. Murayama’s statement is regarded as the “farthest act
of remorse ever expressed by a Japanese politician in contemporary history”
(Cheow 2006: 28).
Only a few days after assuming office, on 8-9 October 2006, Abe went to
Beijing to meet with Chinese PremierWen Jiabao and PresidentHu Jintao, which
had been secretly negotiated prior to his inauguration (Katz/Ennis 2007). The fact
that the trip preceded Japanese Prime Ministers’ traditional visit to Washington
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has to been seen as a conciliatory gesture “wrought with intense symbolism in
Far Eastern diplomacy, which the Chinese and South Koreans would have clearly
noted and appreciated” (Cheow 2006: 28). The Sino-Japanese summit meeting
dramatically improved bilateral relations, and in the joint press statement the
two countries stated that they had agreed to “overcome the political obstacle” of
the Yasukuni issue (NNI, 8/10/06). Abe in turn announced that he would handle
the matter “appropriately” in the future but – due to the complicated domestic
dynamics surrounding the issue – refused any clearer statement with respect to
future visits (Jiang 2007: 25). The two countries announced that they would
“face past history squarely, advance towards the future” and “strive to build a
mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” (MOFA
2006). Hu and Abe both expressed common concern over the pending North
Korean nuclear weapons test and agreed to work closely on that issue as well as
to resolve the East China Sea dispute surrounding China’s development of gas
fields which Tokyo fears could drain away Japan’s deposits (Jiang 2007; NNI,
18/11/06). Another positive sign was Beijing’s and Tokyo’s agreement to conduct
joint research on Sino-Japanese wartime history (Jiang 2007). Furthermore,
Abe went out of his way to appreciate Chinese leadership in the six-party
talks, another gesture that has been valued highly by Beijing (Edström 2007;
Hughes/Krauss 2007). Sino-Japanese relations further improved with Wen’s
three-day trip to Japan in April 2007 (J.A., 3/2007: 100-101). In the first
speech ever given by a Chinese Premier to the Japanese Diet, Wen emphasised
that “[t]he length, scale and influence of China-Japan friendly exchanges are
rarely seen in the course of world civilization” (FMPRC 2007). He furthermore
recognized Japan’s apologies for its past aggression in Asia but also emphasized
that Japan now needed to walk the talk (JT, 13/4/07). Wen avoided addressing
specific political and historical issues which had strained bilateral ties in the
past, like the unresolved territorial disputes, the 1937 Nanjing massacre or the
so-called “comfort women”, forced to work as sex slaves in brothels run by the
Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. Due to the avoidance of
contentious topics, both sides could declare the meeting a success and announced
that the two countries would advance to build a “strategic relationship based on
common interests” (Edström 2007: 64).
Following his visit to Beijing inOctober 2006, Abe went to Seoul to meet with
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine
had worsened the already complicated bilateral relations with South Korea. Thus,
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when Abe arrived in Seoul to repair bilateral relations, he was in for some heavy
lifting. Ironically, it was North Korea’s “great leader” Kim Jong Il who (again)
came to Abe’s rescue. On his way from the airport, the information reached
Abe that North Korea had conducted a nuclear weapons test. The test came as a
shock, and consequently, the common threat posed by Pyongyang dominated the
summit. The North Korean nuclear test demonstrated that the different strategies
of the US, Japan, South Korea and China had not worked out and threatened
the nuclear non-proliferation system. Already in the press conference after the
Sino-Japanese summit meeting, Abe had stressed that a potential North Korean
nuclear test would not be tolerable and posed a grave threat to other states in
the region. He called for consultations among the US, South Korea and China
on how to react to the test, and President Roh said that South Korea would find
it increasingly difficult to continue with its “sunshine policy” towards the North
(Edström 2007). In spite of the nuclear test dominating the summit, Roh, unlike
Beijing, brought up the common history and called for Abe to address topics
like the Yasukuni shrine and the “comfort women”. Abe repeated his Beijing
statement that he would handle the Yasukuni issue “appropriately” and distanced
himself from his own statements in the past when he had denied the existence of
sex slaves by announcing that his government would adhere to Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yo¯hei Ko¯no’s 1993 statement that admitted the use of sex slaves by
the Japanese military during the Second World War (Edström 2007: 59). Hopes
for a Japanese-Korean détente further increased as Tokyo announced its support
for then Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon’s candidacy for the succession of
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Shim 2006).
Abe’s forgoing to visit the Yasukuni shrine during his termhas helped to reduce
tensions with Japan’s neighbours. However, a lot of historical and political issues
remain to be resolved and continue to lurk in the background. Thus, fears of
increasing tensions with South Korea and China resurfaced when Abe claimed in
March 2007 thatwith respect to the “comfortwomen”, there was no evidence for
the use of “coercion in a narrow sense” by the Japanese military (NNI, 17/9/07;
WSJ, 21/4/07). The remark shows that Abe has difficulties in “restraining his
revisionist views” (Hughes/Krauss 2007: 170), and the immediate flare-up of
criticism in the media forced him to “bend over backwards” (Edström 2007: 76)
and to apologize repeatedly (BBC News 2007).
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Building New Alliances, Improving the Old One?
Fostering Strategic Relations with India and Australia
Already during his campaign to succeed Koizumi, Abe called for a strategic
alliance among the democracies of the region (Edström 2007). As a part of
his agenda and building on initiatives of his predecessors, most notably Yoshiro¯
Mori and Koizumi, Prime Minister Abe has sought to further deepen strategic
relations with India (Jain 2007). During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh’s visit to Japan in December 2006, the two heads of government agreed to
improve bilateral relations and to move towards a strategic and global partnership
through intensified economic, political and security cooperation. Singh expressed
understanding for Japanese concern about North Korea’s nuclear weapons test
as well as the abduction issue and lobbied for Japanese support for the “U.S.-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Pact”, aimed at US support for the
development of an Indian nuclear programme for civilian purposes. A sign
for the progressive partnership between India and Japan was a one-day joint
navy manoeuvre conducted three weeks later together with US forces. India-
Japan relations received another boost in August 2007, when Abe went on a
one-week trip to Indonesia, India and Malysia. At the centre of Abe’s meeting
with his counterpart Singh were bilateral economic relations as well as defence
cooperation. In his speech to the Indian parliament, Abe emphasized the two
countries’ friendship and strategic partnership and called for India’s participation
in a wider Asian partnership, including the US and Australia. Abe was the first
foreign statesman to receive the honour to speak to the Indian parliament since
US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000. During a meeting of the two
countries’ defence ministers, India and Japan agreed on a 37-point programme
on strategic cooperation, in particular on sea-lane security, exchanges in defence
issues and regular meetings of navy officials. In September 2007, the two
countries participated in a joint navy manoeuvre in the Bay of Bengal, together
with Australia, the US and Singapore (J.A., 1/2007: 85-86, 3/2007: 98-99,
5/2007: 98-99; Mansingh 2007; Scott 2007).
There are political, economic and strategic reasons for closer ties between
India and Japan. Economically, both countries can profit significantly from closer
cooperation, as Japan is rich in high technology and investment capital, whereas
India has a young and well educated work force, which can complement Japan’s
ageing population. India is also keen to gather Japanese support for its civilian
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nuclear programme, and a Japanese recognition of India as a nuclear power
opens up opportunities for Japanese firms in the energy sector. Abe’s visits to
India suggested his readiness to accept it as a nuclear power. However, that
would contradict Tokyo’s non-proliferation and disarmament policies, as India
is neither a signatory to the NPT nor to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and
Abe has been careful to avoid addressing the issue in public. In political terms,
India and Japan share common values like democracy, the rule of law and respect
for human rights. Both countries aspire to secure a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council. Furthermore, Japan is Asia’s biggest donor of foreign aid, and
thus could be an ally in India’s efforts to stabilise its economically underdeveloped
neighbours. Finally, the two countries share common strategic goals like access to
energy sources, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sea-
lane security and the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, Tokyo is concerned
about a rising China whose influence India could help contain. While New Delhi
and Tokyo are cautious not to alienate China publicly, in particular in association
with the two countries’ joint manoeuvres, the swift upgrading of China’s naval
forces is met with concern in Japanese policy circles (J.A., 1/2007: 85-86, 3/2007:
98-99, 5/2007: 98-99; Hirabayashi 2007;Mansingh 2007; ST, 23, 25/8/07; Toki
2007).
Abe has also been tightening Japan’s strategic relations with Australia. During
Prime Minister John Howard’s trip to Tokyo in March 2007, Japan and Australia
signed the “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”. The
historic declaration envisages a closer cooperation between the two countries on a
number of issues, including North Korea, counterterrorism and non-proliferation,
elevating Australia to Japan’s second most important ally. During his visit,
Prime Minister Howard emphasized Japan’s role as Australia’s most reliable
partner in the region. The two countries’ armed forces have already gathered
experiences in a number of joint missions, among them the UN peacekeeping
operation in Cambodia in 1992 and in the Iraq war of 2003. Thus far, however,
security cooperation has taken place within the framework of both countries’
bilateral alliances with the United States, most notably in the context of joint
naval exercises and in the fields of BMD and non-proliferation. The bilateral
declaration has increasedTokyo’s diplomatic independence from the United States
(WSJ, 15/3/07). Although Tokyo and Canberra were quick to announce that the
increased security cooperation was not directed against China, in fact the People’s
Republic is as much a factor behind the tightened relations as are North Korea’s
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nuclear ambitions, since Canberra shares Tokyo’s and Washington’s suspicion
of China’s military build-up (J.A., 2/2007: 104-105; Sakaeda 2007b; Taylor
2007; WSJ, 15/3/07; Yamamoto 2007). In September 2007, Abe and Howard
met again on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in
Sydney. The two heads of government adopted an action plan strengthening
cooperation in various fields, ranging from the abduction issue and North Korea’s
nuclear programme over UN reforms, law enforcement and border control to
non-proliferation, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions, in order for
the two countries to “make [a] further contribution to regional and global peace
and stability”, as Abe pointed out (NNI, 9/9/07).
A Koizumi Sequel? Abe and the US-Japan Alliance
Apart from fostering strategic relations with India and Australia, Abe has also
worked to strengthen Japan’s traditional alliance with the US. When Prime
Minister Koizumi stepped down, speculations were expressed that this might
have a negative affect on US-Japanese ties, which had reached an unprecedented
closeness. Koizumi and US President George W. Bush were connected by a close
personal friendship (Cossa 2007; Green 2006; ST, 1/10/07).5 His successor Abe
has made clear that maintaining a close relationship with Washington based on
common values is one of his key priorities. After his first meeting with Bush on
the sidelines of the 2006 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting
in Hanoi, Abe pointed out that the US and Japan “share an alliance which is
based on fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy, basic human rights
and the rule of law” (The White House 2006). He reiterated this position during
his April 2007 visit to Washington and announced that it was his declared aim
to “reaffirm the irreplaceable Japan-U.S. alliance, and to grow this stronger as
an unshakable alliance” (The White House 2007a). Abe’s strong emphasis on
US-Japan relations is not surprising, given the fact that as Cabinet Secretary, he
was instrumental in pushing through the legislation to allow for the Self Defence
Forces’ (SDF) deployment to Iraq (Green 2006; Taniguchi 2006). Consequently,
Abe continued Koizumi’s course of strengthening cooperation with the US.
5 However, as Michael Green has pointed out, the strategic convergence between the two states
began before Koizumi assumed office, and the close personal relationship between Koizumi and
Bush was “as much a reflection of the closer strategic, ideational, and economic convergence of
the United States and Japan in the twenty-first century as it was the cause” (Green 2006: 109).
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Reacting to the changing security environment, Abe aims to “move Japan beyond
the post-war regime” (The White House 2007a), as he made clear during his
visit to Washington, and to boost Japan’s ability to act on the international
stage. Aiming at Japan’s emergence as a “normal” power and increased burden
sharing with the US, Abe is in strong favour of collective self-defence. In line
with this objective, Abe has advocated a revision of the constitution – a goal
Washington has long been pushing for, as the constitution restricts Japan’s role in
the alliance (Ackerman/Kawagishi 2007; Nishihara 2007). Thus far, Abe has put
through parliament the national referendum law, which constitutes procedures
for a referendum, a necessary step on the way to the constitutional revision (NNI,
22/10/07). Another step in the direction of a more active Japanese security role
is the transformation of the Japan Defence Agency into the Ministry of Defence,
which was implemented in January 2007 (cf. Sakaeda 2007a). Underlying these
measures is the conviction that, as Bush remarked at the 2006 APEC meeting
in Hanoi, “strengthening our alliance would be a good in maintaining peace
and security of not just Japan and the region surrounding Japan, but the entire
world” (The White House 2006). Overall, Abe has proved to be a loyal (although
more self-confident) ally to the US, carrying forward Koizumi’s disputed policies
of Japanese participation in the GWOT and the realignment of US forces on
Japanese territory (J.A., 3/2007: 103-105; McCormack 2007). Abe even tied his
premiership to an extension of the ATSML, necessary for a continuation of the
SDF’s refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean, when facing fierce opposition by
the Democratic Party of Japan (ST, 10/9/07). His close connection to Washington
cannot, however, be explained solely by the shared values that Abe emphasizes.
The changing regional environment (most notably the North Korean threat and
the rise of China) plays a crucial role in Japan’s shifting security policy, including
the alliance with the United States.
Although Abe has overall worked to further deepen bilateral relationship with
the US, his remark in March 2007 about the “comfort women” not having been
forced into sex slavery has had a negative effect on US-Japanese ties. Despite
his apology, shortly after the lost upper house election in July 2007, the US
House of Representatives issued a symbolic resolution calling for Tokyo to
apologize for the “comfort women” issue (JT, 31/7/07). This had been triggered
by an advertisement published in the Washington Post, in which 44 individuals,
among them Japanese parliamentarians, had claimed that there was no evidence
that women had been forced into prostitution (J.A., 4/2007: 117-119). In
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combination with Japan’s portraying itself as a victim in the abduction issue,
Tokyo is often perceived as hypocritical in US policy circles. Furthermore,
when former Defence Minister Fumio Kyu¯ma remarked that the US atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki “couldn’t be helped”, he set off another
controversy. The subsequent insistence of US Undersecretary of State Robert
Joseph on the legitimacy of the bombings triggered harsh criticism in Japan. With
differences over how to handle the North Korean issue, Tokyo’s decreasing of
US-focused personnel and the ebbing of business leaders willing to contribute
to the promotion of US-Japanese exchanges, fears of the alliance hollowing out
have increasingly been voiced in the media (NNI, 17/9/07). However, the two
statesmen have continued to emphasize their countries’ and close personal ties
(The White House 2007b).
The Road Ahead: Fukuda’s Pragmatic Approach to Foreign
Policy
Abe’s foreign policy presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, despite his
reputation as an ultranationalist and his announcement to work for the abol-
ishment of the “post-war regime” prior to assuming office, Abe proved to be
rather pragmatic in foreign relations (Katz/Ennis 2007), most notably in his
treatment of the Yasukuni issue. Abe’s most significant achievement in Japan’s
foreign relations was his successful policy of détente towards China and South
Korea. Due to Abe’s efforts, the Yasukuni issue has decreased in importance,
which opens up the possibility of a lasting improvement of Japan’s relations
with its neighbours. Like his predecessor, he put emphasis on the deepening
of the US-Japan alliance, and he worked to build strategic relations with other
democracies in the region like India and Australia. Furthermore, although critical
scholars saw Abe as an inexperienced prime minister in a “rush to overturn
six decades of official pacifism” (Ackerman/Kawagishi 2007), he (like Koizumi)
merely reflected Japans ongoing metamorphosis towards a more active role in
international politics (Katz/Ennis 2007). His more assertive foreign policy did
not mark a radical re-orientation towards becoming a great military power but
simply an “updated version of the Yoshida Doctrine” (Mochizuki 2007a: 195),
that is, Japan’s post-war policy, introduced by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida,
of pursuing economic recovery while relying militarily on the US. On the other
hand, Abe’s awkward handling of the “comfort women” issue not only aroused
criticism from China and South Korea but also continues to pose differences
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with the US. As Richard Samuels stresses, “Japan’s unwillingness or inability to
confront its history squarely is undoubtedly the largest single constraint on its
diplomacy” (Samuels 2006: 121). Furthermore, Abe’s tough stance on North
Korea, in particular his insistence on the abduction issue being discussed at the
six-party talks, hampered his ability to influence the negotiations on the North
Korean nuclear program.
In the immediate aftermath of Abe’s resignation it first seemed that LDP
Secretary-General and former Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro¯ Aso¯ would
succeed Abe (Köllner 2007), but instead former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo
Fukuda prevailed. Aso¯ had been foreign minister in the Abe cabinet, and due to
the widespread disappointment with the Abe administration, Aso¯ stood no real
chance to succeed him (J.A., 5/2007: 101-102). Fukuda is considered to be a
moderate politician, willing to compromise (ibid.). Also in matters of foreign
policy, he stands for a very pragmatic approach (Tanaka 2007). Already during
the run-up to succeed Koizumi, during which he competed against Abe, Fukuda
rested his claim mainly on the restoration of friendly ties with Beijing and Seoul
(Jiang 2007). He called for intensified economic cooperation with China and
South Korea to achieve a further integration of the region and opposed Abe’s plan
to revise the constitution, anxious to alarm Japan’s neighbours. Furthermore,
Fukuda clearly opposed Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine and warned that
they could lead to Japan’s isolation in Asia (Tanaka 2007). Thus, Fukuda is likely
to continue Abe’s policy of détente towards China and South Korea (Klingner
2007). One such step presents Fukuda’s agreement with Chinese Ambassador to
Japan Cui Tiankai to search for a settlement of the bilateral dispute over the gas
fields in the East China Sea (Kyodo, 5/11/07, in: BBC-Email, 5/11/07). Fukuda
has furthermore continued to keep a rather tough stance on the abduction issue.
This became clear through the fact that, despite a breakthrough in the six-party
talks, Tokyo has further extended the sanctions againstNorth Korea (cf. Johannes
Gerschewski’s article in these pages).
The new Prime Minister is also likely to push for increased US-Japan relations.
Fukuda, like Abe, was instrumental in bringing about Japan’s participation in the
GWOT (Green 2006). However, Fukuda is “rooted in the LDP’s more pacifist
traditions” (Glosserman 2007) and thus less likely to push for a removal of legal
restrictions on the use of force (Klingner 2007). Furthermore, the US-Japan
alliance has been complicated by the fact that, due to the DPJ’s opposition,
the SDF’s refuelling mission was terminated because the ATSML could not
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be extended. In order to get the ATSML accepted, Fukuda has even offered
DPJ leader Ichiro¯ Ozawa to join the LDP in a grand coalition. Ozawa faced
fierce opposition from within the DPJ for not having turned down the offer
immediately (NNI, 5/11/07). According to the Japanese Ambassador to the
United States Ryo¯zo¯ Kato¯, the failure to push through with the ATSML has left
US-Japan relations “the most difficult and delicate” in years (Kyodo, 4/11/07, in:
BBC-Email, 6/11/07).
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